MOGADISHU, Somalia — September 11, 2026 — Reported cooperation between Yemen’s Houthi movement and Al-Shabaab is raising security concerns in Somalia, with United Nations findings and regional studies pointing to meetings, weapons transfers and technical training involving networks operating across the Gulf of Aden.

Security specialists say closer coordination could provide Al-Shabaab with access to more advanced weapons, armed-drone technology and maritime smuggling routes. Such capabilities could increase the threat facing Somali security forces, African Union personnel, civilians and critical infrastructure.

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, control the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, and large areas of northern and western Yemen. Their location across the Gulf of Aden places them close to Somalia’s extensive coastline, parts of which have long been used by arms traffickers, human smugglers and piracy networks.

Al-Shabaab is a Sunni militant organisation affiliated with Al-Qaeda, while the Houthis belong to Yemen’s Zaydi Shia community. Despite their ideological differences, international reports suggest the two organisations have pursued cooperation based on shared military, financial and maritime interests.

Reported meetings and weapons transfers

A United Nations report published in February 2025 said Houthi and Al-Shabaab representatives reportedly met in Somalia in July and September 2024. According to the findings, their discussions concerned the transfer of weapons and military expertise in exchange for support with piracy and arms smuggling.

The report indicated that Al-Shabaab received technical instruction and weapons shipments from Yemen between June and September 2024. Some of those weapons were reportedly used during attacks against African Union forces later that year.

The UN also reported that Al-Shabaab sent more than a dozen operatives to Yemen to obtain training from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The training reportedly included operational knowledge related to unmanned aerial vehicles.

The reports have increased concerns that Al-Shabaab could expand its use of drones beyond surveillance, intelligence gathering and propaganda. Access to weaponised drones would give the group another method of attacking military bases, government facilities and other protected sites.

The full scale of the reported cooperation cannot be independently established because the suspected transactions involve secretive militant and smuggling networks operating in Somalia and Yemen.

Puntland drone seizure

In August 2024, Puntland security forces arrested seven suspected militants and seized five suicide drones allegedly transported from Yemen, according to reports later cited by regional security researchers.

The seizure raised questions about the movement of drone components and technical expertise through northern Somalia. Puntland’s coastline faces Yemen and contains several remote landing points that are difficult for security agencies to monitor continuously.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported in March 2025 that the Houthis had developed contacts with Al-Shabaab and Islamic State militants in Somalia. The research group said such relationships could diversify weapons supplies, strengthen illicit commercial networks and expand militant influence over maritime routes.

No public evidence has established that the drones seized in Puntland were intended specifically for Al-Shabaab. However, security researchers have warned that weapons moving through the same trafficking corridors could reach several armed organisations operating in Somalia.

Threat to Somalia and regional shipping

Somalia and Yemen sit on opposite sides of the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The waterway connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, making it a vital route for international trade.

Since November 2023, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted commercial and military vessels using missiles, drones and explosive boats. The group has described the campaign as a response to the war in Gaza.

The attacks prompted several shipping companies to redirect vessels around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa. The longer route increased transportation times, fuel consumption and freight costs, affecting trade between Asia, Europe and Africa.

In May 2025, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies said growing cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab was increasing maritime and land-based threats on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. It warned that Somali militant and criminal networks could assist with piracy, weapons trafficking and information about ships operating outside the Houthis’ normal surveillance range.

An increase in maritime insecurity could directly affect Somalia by raising import costs and threatening commercial traffic serving its ports. Somalia relies heavily on imported food, fuel and manufactured goods, leaving consumers vulnerable to disruptions and higher shipping charges.

Wider Horn of Africa concerns

The risks extend beyond Somalia. Djibouti, which hosts several foreign military bases, lies close to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and handles most of landlocked Ethiopia’s maritime trade.

Kenya has also suffered repeated Al-Shabaab attacks. Security officials fear that any improvement in the group’s weapons or drone capabilities could create additional threats for countries contributing troops or logistical support to operations in Somalia.

The UN Security Council maintains sanctions targeting Al-Shabaab and continues to monitor its finances, weapons supplies and external relationships through its Panel of Experts on Somalia.

For Somalia, the central concern is whether cooperation with the Houthis could give Al-Shabaab capabilities it has previously struggled to obtain. Armed drones, improved missiles or advanced technical training could complicate military operations and increase the danger to security bases and civilian areas.

The maritime dimension creates a second threat. Cooperation among militants, arms traffickers and pirates could connect Somalia’s insurgency to the wider Red Sea crisis, exposing the country to security and economic shocks originating beyond its borders.

The reported relationship could also place greater pressure on Somalia’s limited maritime forces. Monitoring a coastline stretching more than 3,000 kilometres requires intelligence-sharing, patrol vessels and cooperation among federal authorities, regional administrations and international naval missions.